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The Copyright Act includes a set of copyright infringement exceptions that permit the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted works in order to serve public interest objectives. The 
Supreme Court of Canada liberally interpreted these exceptions as “users’ rights” by 
relying on the purpose of the Act, understood as a balance between the authors’ right to 
be rewarded for their works and the public interest in the dissemination and use of works. 
The utility of copyright balance to safeguard users’ rights is uncertain. The Act does not 
explicitly adopt “balance” as a purpose. National and international copyright law 
traditionally recognize the users’ side in the copyright law balance in copyright exceptions 
and limitations. And, in copyright law discourse, different stakeholders propose and defend 
conflicting forms of balance. Therefore, the paper argues that a human rights-based 
approach to copyright exceptions is more persuasive in justifying their interpretation as 
users’ rights. Copyright users’ rights mirror the content of the human rights to participate 
in culture, education, and freedom of expression, which Canada is obliged to implement 
as a State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The proposed approach would 
align the discourse with key elements of Canadian jurisprudence: (1) human rights as 
reinforcers of the rule of law; (2) international human rights law as an interpretive tool 
for Canadian courts; and (3) the need to interpret Canadian legislation in a manner that 
does not breach international obligations. 
 
La Loi sur le droit d’auteur inclut une série d’exceptions à la violation du droit d’auteur 
qui permettent l’utilisation sans autorisation d’œuvres protégées par le droit d’auteur pour 
atteindre des objectifs d’intérêt public. La Cour suprême du Canada a interprété largement 
ces exceptions comme étant des « droits d’utilisateur » en s’appuyant sur l’objectif de la 
Loi, considéré comme étant l’équilibre entre le droit des auteurs de tirer profit de leurs 
œuvres et l’intérêt public dans la diffusion et l’utilisation de ces œuvres. L’utilité de 
l’équilibre en matière de droit d’auteur dans la protection des droits des utilisateurs est 
incertaine. La Loi n’adopte pas explicitement l’objectif de l’« équilibre ». Le droit national 
et international en matière de droit d’auteur reconnaît traditionnellement le point de vue 
des utilisateurs dans cet équilibre sous forme d’exceptions et de restrictions au droit 
d’auteur. Également, dans les discussions sur le droit d’auteur, divers intéressés proposent 
et défendent des formes contradictoires d’équilibre. En conséquence, l’article soutient 
qu’une conception des exceptions au droit d’auteur qui est fondée sur les droits de la 
personne justifie de façon plus persuasive qu’on les interprète comme des droits 
d’utilisateurs. Les droits des utilisateurs d’œuvres protégées par le droit d’auteur reflètent 
le contenu des droits humains de participer à la culture, à l’éducation et à la liberté 
d’expression, que le Canada a l’obligation d’appliquer en tant qu’État partie du Pacte 
international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels et du Pacte international 
relatif aux droits civils et politiques. L’approche proposée harmoniserait le discours avec 
les éléments clés de la jurisprudence canadienne : 1) les droits de la personne comme 
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remparts de la primauté du droit; 2) le droit international en matière de droits de la 
personne comme outil d’interprétation pour les tribunaux du Canada; 3) le besoin 





The Copyright Act1 is the source of copyright protection in Canada.2 It grants authors a bundle of exclusive 
economic rights over their copyrighted works (“works”) to create their market.3 The Act limits the duration 
of authors’ economic rights.4 It also subjects them to exceptions that serve interconnected public interest 
objectives by allowing users to use works without the permission of the copyright holders, subject to 
specific conditions.5 Copyright exceptions are “an integral part”6 of Canadian copyright law and a 
requirement for the existence of a rich public domain.7 In CCH, the Supreme Court of Canada [SCC] held 
that “Canada’s Copyright Act sets out the rights and obligations of both copyright owners and users”8 and 
that copyright exceptions are “users rights”9 necessary “to maintain the proper balance between the rights 
of a copyright owner and users’ interests”10 and hence “must not be interpreted restrictively.”11 Subsequent 
SCC decisions have reiterated that copyright exceptions are users’ rights.12 
 The concept “users’ rights” does not appear in the Act. Thus, the SCC’s characterisation of copyright 
exceptions as users’ rights has generated different reactions by the copyright law community in Canada. 
Creator and publisher groups warned that a literal use of the term—users’ rights—“would substantially 
curtail copyright holders’ rights and permit extensive copying on behalf of others”13 and so it must be 
                                                             
*  Senior Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen. I would like to thank Dr. Pascale Chapdelaine, Dr. Ubong 
Effeh, the participants in the “Copyright User Rights and Access to Justice Conference” hosted by the University of 
Windsor Faculty of Law on 18-19 May 2017, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. Any errors or omissions are my responsibility alone. 
1  Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 [Copyright Act]. 
2  Compo Co. v Blue Crest Music Inc, [1980] 1 SCR 357 at 373, 105 DLR (3d) 249. 
3  Copyright Act, supra note 1, s 3(1); William M Landes & Richard A Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” 
(1989) 18 J Leg Stud 325 at 328. Under s 14.1 of the Act, authors also have moral rights. 
4  Copyright Act, supra note 1, s 6. 
5  Teresa Scassa, “Interests in the Balance” in Michael Geist, ed, In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright 
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 41 at 59 [Scassa, “Interests in the Balance”]; Martin Senftleben, “The International 
Three-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation” (2010) 1 JIPITEC 67 at 67. 
6  CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para 48, [2004] 1 SCR 339 [CCH]. Accord Society 
of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para 11, [2012] 2 SCR 326 
[SOCAN v Bell]. 
7  Théberge v Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34 at para 32, [2002] 2 SCR 336 [Théberge]; SOCAN v 
Bell, supra note 6 at para 10. 
8  CCH, supra note 6 at para 11. 
9  Ibid at para 12. 
10  Ibid at para 48. 
11  Ibid. 
12  See SOCAN v Bell, supra note 6 at para 11; Alberta (Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access 
Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 at para 22, [2012] 2 SCR 345 [Alberta (Education)]. 
13  Canadian Publishers’ Council, The Association of Canadian Publishers, and The Canadian Educational Resources 
Council, Memorandum of Argument, online: scribd <https://www.scribd.com/document/73790862/CPC-SCC-
Interveners-Memorandum> at para 25. 
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understood merely as “a metaphor to express the importance of user interests.”14 In contrast, public domain 
advocates welcomed the SCC’s formulation of copyright exceptions as users’ rights and many copyright 
law scholars wrote in support of it.15 
 The future of users’ rights in Canada is uncertain. Lower courts may rely on the exact wording of the 
Act to interpret copyright exceptions restrictively.16 The centrality of balancing in Canadian copyright law 
“cannot change the express terms of the Copyright Act,”17 and invoking copyright balance to justify users’ 
rights comes with shortcomings including its contentious meaning in copyright law discourse. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, creator and publisher groups attempted to convince the SCC to reconsider its 
approach to users’ rights.18  
 The purpose of this paper is to highlight the human rights nature of users’ rights in order to: 1) reveal 
the linkage between users’ rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;19 2) prove that users’ 
“rights” must have a literal, not a metaphorical, meaning in copyright law; and 3) secure users’ rights 
against any inadvertent downgrading by courts in light of the volatility of the copyright balance basis of 
users’ rights.20 The SCC jurisprudence on users’ rights echoes the human rights nature of users’ 
entitlements over works by virtue of their right to participate in culture,21 which is interdependent with 
the human right to education22 and freedom of expression.23 These “users’ human rights” are 
interdependent and interrelated with authors’ moral and material interests in international human rights 
law.24 Accordingly, the Canadian Parliament is invited to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the nature of 
                                                             
14  Ibid. See also Barry Sookman, “Copyright Reform for Canada: What Should We Do?, Copyright Consultations 
Submission” (2009) 2:2 OHRLP 73 at 88 (arguing that “[i]t is conceptually wrong to suggest that copyright law confers 
on users affirmative rights to access and use works or to exercise ‘rights’ such as a right of fair dealing”). 
15  See e.g. Teresa Scassa, “Users’ Rights in the Balance: Recent Developments in Copyright Law at the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2005) 22 CIPR 133; Abraham Drassinower “Taking User Rights Seriously” in Geist, Public Interest, supra 
note 5, 462; David Vaver, “User Rights” (2013) 25 IPJ 105 [Vaver, “User Rights”]; Myra J Tawfik, “International 
Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’ as a ‘User Right’” (2005) e-Copyright Bulletin 1; Michael Geist, “The Canadian 
Copyright Story: How Canada Improbably Became the World Leader on Users’ Rights in Copyright Law” in Ruth L 
Okediji, ed, Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 
169. 
16  See e.g. The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (“Access Copyright”) v York University, 2017 FC 669 and United 
Airlines, Inc v Cooperstock, 2017 FC 616. See also Michael Geist, “Ignoring the Supreme Court: Federal Court Judge 
Hands Access Copyright Fair Dealing Victory” (13 July 2017), Michael Geist (blog), online: 
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/07/ignoring-supreme-court-trial-judge-hands-access-copyright-fair-dealing-victory/>; 
Carys Craig, “The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian Copyright Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform” in 
Geist, supra note 5, 437 at 438 [Craig, “Fair Dealing”] 
17  Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57 [2015] 3 SCR 615 at para 51 [CBC v SODRAC]. 
18  See Michael Geist, “Introduction” in Michael Geist, ed, The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada 
Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) iii. 
19  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, [Charter]. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides: (“The Constitution of Canada is 
the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect”). 
20  See Graeme Dinwoodie, “The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Transition to the Future of International Copyright 
Lawmaking?” (2010) 57(4) Case W Res L Rev 751 at 753 (arguing that in copyright law balance is used “too glibly”). 
21  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, UN Doc A/810 (1948), art 27(1) 
[UDHR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 
1976 No 46, art 15(1)(a)-(b) [ICESCR]. 
22  UDHR, supra note 21, art 26; ICESCR, supra note 21, art 13. 
23  UDHR, supra note 21, art 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, 
Can TS 1976 No 47 [ICCPR], art 19. 
24  UDHR, supra note 21, art 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 21, art 15(1)(c). 
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users’ entitlements over works by amending the Act to refer to them explicitly as users’ rights.25 
Meanwhile, Canadian courts have a compelling reason to become vocal about the human right nature of 
these rights and benefit from their interpretation in international human rights law when determining their 
content and contours.26 
 The paper has 6 sections. Following this introduction, Section II discusses the limitations of the 
copyright balance approach to users’ rights. Section III unfolds the human rights law basis of users’ rights. 
Section IV discusses the extent to which the SCC’s fair dealing jurisprudence echoes users’ human rights 
to participate in culture, freedom of expression, and education, and analyses the role that international 
human rights law can play in influencing the status of users’ rights under Canadian copyright law. Section 
V explains the interdependence between users’ human rights and authors’ moral and material interests in 
international human rights law. Section VI is a conclusion. 
 
II. USERS’ RIGHTS AS THE OFFSPRING OF COPYRIGHT BALANCE  
 
 As a general rule, any person who exercises any of the exclusive rights of the author without her or his 
permission infringes copyright.27 However, the Act exempts from this rule specific unauthorised uses of 
the works by any person, such as fair dealing,28 and specific unauthorised uses by specific users, such as 
the reproduction of works in alternate format by persons with perceptual disabilities.29 Each of these 
exceptions is subject to conditions. For instance, in the case of fair dealing: 1) the unauthorised dealing of 
the work must be for the purpose of research, private study, education, parody or satire, criticism or review, 
or news reporting;30 2) the dealing must be fair;31 and 3) in the case of news reporting and criticism or 
review, the source and the author, if mentioned in the source, must be acknowledged.32 While fair dealing 
does not give rise to any compensation to the author whose work is used, some copyright exceptions, such 
as private copying, are attached to a compensation scheme.33 
 In Théberge, the SCC explained the importance of copyright exceptions in enriching the public domain: 
“[e]xcessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit 
the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests 
of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization.”34 The SCC also identified the 
                                                             
25  Copyright Act, supra note 1, s 92 provides for its mandatory review by a parliamentary committee to be established for 
this purpose every five years. The next review is due in 2017. 
26  See Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, “The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human Rights” (2010) 
27 Wis Int’l L J 637 at 661-662. 
27  Copyright Act, supra note 1, s 27(1). 
28  Ibid, s 29. 
29  Ibid, s 32. 
30  Ibid, s 29. 
31  Ibid, s 29. 
32  Ibid, s 29(1)-(2). For a discussion of fair dealing under Canadian copyright law see Daniel Gervais, “Fair Use, Fair 
Dealing, Fair Principles: Efforts To Conceptualize Exceptions and Limitations To Copyright” (2010) 57 J Copyright 
Soc’y USA 499; Craig, “Fair Dealing”, supra note 16; Ariel Katz, “Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada” 
in Geist, Copyright Pentalogy, supra note 18, 93; Michael Geist, “Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from 
Fair Dealing to Fair Use” in Geist, Copyright Pentalogy, supra note 18, 157; Giuseppina D’Agostino, “Healing Fair 
Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use” (2008) 
53 McGill LJ 309. 
33  See e.g. Copyright Act, supra note 1, Part VIII. 
34  Théberge, supra note 7 at para 32. See also M William Krasilovsky, “Observations on Public Domain” (1967) 14 Bull 
Copyright Soc'y USA 205 at 205 (describing the public domain as “the other side of the coin of copyright”). 
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purpose of the Act as “a balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect, and obtaining a just reward for the creator (or, more 
accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be 
generated).”35 Since Théberge, the SCC has repeatedly held that balance is the purpose of the Act,36 
identified more of its elements,37 and relied upon it to treat copyright exceptions as users’ rights.38 In CCH, 
the SCC held: “[t]he fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In 
order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must 
not be interpreted restrictively.”39 
 If users’ rights are to have a literal rather than a metaphorical meaning, they need more normative 
support than that they derive from the necessary balance between the public interest in works and authors’ 
right to a just reward. Recognising the limited nature of authors’ rights is as old as the modern national 
copyright law, so is the idea of fairly managing (or balancing) the inherent tension between authors (or 
their assignees) and users of works.40 In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, this balance has statutorily 
taken the formula of copyright protection accompanied by exceptions and limitations.41 In Théberge, the 
SCC clearly departed from its earlier decision in Bishop v Stevens,42 in which it held that the Act ‘‘was 
passed with a single object, namely, the benefit of authors of all kinds, whether the works were literary, 
dramatic or musical.”43 In doing so, the SCC “reflected a move away from an earlier, author-centric view 
which focused on the exclusive right of authors and copyright owners to control how their works were 
used in the marketplace.”44  The SCC explicitly acknowledged the traditional formula of balance: it 
identified as an element of balance “recognizing the creator’s rights”45 and “giving due weight to their 
                                                             
35  Théberge, supra note 7 at para 30. 
36  See e.g. Robertson v Thomson Corp, 2 SCR 363 at para 69, [2006] 2 SCR 363 [Justice Abella (dissenting in part on the 
cross-appeal)]; CCH, supra note 6 at para 10; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 
Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 SCR 427 [SOCAN]; SOCAN v Bell, supra 
note 6 at para 8. 
37  See e.g. CCH, supra note 6 at para 24 & 25 (adopting the author’s non-trivial and non-mechanical skill and judgment 
standard of originality). But see Abraham Drassinower, “From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of 
Balance in Copyright Law” (2009) 34 J Corp L 991 at 995-997 (criticizing the reliance on balance to formulate the 
originality standard in CCH). 
38  See CCH, supra note 6 at para 12; SOCAN v Bell, supra note 6 at para 11; Alberta (Education), supra note 12 at para 22. 
39  CCH, supra note 6 at para 48. 
40  See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of 
such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned, 1710 (UK), 8 Anne c 19; Sayre v Moore (1785), 1 East 361 at 362 
(Lord Mansfield, CJ); Christophe Geiger, Jonathan Griffiths & Reto M. Hilty, “Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation 
of the ‘Three-Step Test’ in Copyright Law” (2008) 39:6 Intl Rev Intellectual Property & Copyright L 707 at 709; United 
States, The Committee on Commerce, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (HR Rep No 105-551(II)) at 26; 
Pamela Samuelson, “Does Information Really Have to be Licensed?”, Communications of the ACM 41:9 (September 
1998) 15 at 15; Daniel J Gervais, “Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and 
Limitations” (2008) 5:1&2 UOLTJ 1 at 12 [Gervais, “Making Copyright Whole”]. 
41  Daniel J Gervais, “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) 2 UOLTJ 315 at 320-321. 
42  [1990] 2 SCR 467. 
43  Ibid at 478. 
44  SOCAN v Bell, supra note 6 at para 9. See also Vaver, “User Rights”, supra note 15 at 107 (noting that Théberge was the 
turning point at which the SCC started to reject the “author-centric dogma”). Nevertheless, before Théberge, Canadian 
copyright policies and scholarship often emphasized the importance of copyright balance. See e.g. Beverley McLachlin, 
“Intellectual Property—What’s it All About?” in GF Henderson, ed, Trade-Marks Law of Canada (Scarborough, ON: 
Carswell, 1993) 391 at 397. 
45  Théberge, supra note 7 at para 31. 
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limited nature,”46 which is “reflected in the exceptions to copyright infringement […], which seek to 
protect the public domain ...”47 In CCH, the SCC did not explain why the balance struck in the Act, and 
represented by the formula of copyright along with exceptions and limitations, became out-dated. It is 
understandable that new technological developments increased users’ need to access and use works and, 
at the same time, created some barriers for such uses, such as when the works are protected by 
technological protection measures [TPMs].48 Yet, the latest amendment to the Act in 201249 updated the 
copyright law balance by introducing new copyright exceptions, not users’ rights.50 
 Canada is a State Party to the international copyright instruments that refer to the notion of balance, 
such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS],51 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty [WCT]52 and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty [WPPT].53 TRIPS lists as 
one of its objectives the contribution to a “balance between rights and obligations”54  and the preambles 
to the WCT and the WPPT acknowledge “the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors 
[and the rights of performers and producers of phonograms] and the larger public interest, particularly 
education, research and access to information...”55 The predominant understanding of balance in these 
instruments revolves around the formula of copyright protection, on the one hand, and copyright 
exceptions and limitations, on the other.56 In international copyright law, the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works first adopted this formula.57 This proves, Professor Daniel 
Gervais argues, that balance was “very present to the minds of”58 the drafters of the Convention.59 
Similarly, Professor Graeme Dinwoodie argues that the Berne Convention has “plenty of room for 
balance”60 for a number of reasons including its flexible provisions allowing its States Parties to enjoy a 
high level of flexibility in designing balanced copyright laws through copyright exceptions and 
                                                             
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid at para 32. 
48  Elizabeth F Judge & Saleh Al-Sharieh, “Join the Club: The Implications of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement's 
Enforcement Measures for Canadian Copyright Law” (2012) 49 Alta L Rev 677 at 733-734. 
49  Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20. 
50  See “Speech from the Throne to open the First Session Forty First Parliament of Canada” (3 June 2011), online: 
Parliament of Canada <https://lop.parl.ca/ParlInfo/Documents/ThroneSpeech/41-1-e.html> (promising to amend the Act 
by a “legislation that balances the needs of creators and users”); Teresa Scassa, “Acknowledging Copyright’s Illegitimate 
Offspring: User-Generated Content and Canadian Copyright Law” in Geist, Copyright Pentalogy, supra note 18, 431 at 
435 (arguing that “the UGC exception is part of the legislative balance aimed at achieving the public policy objectives 
underlying copyright law”). 
51  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 [TRIPS]. 
52  WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 65 [WCT]. 
53  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, 36 ILM 76 [WPPT]. 
54  TRIPS, supra note 51, art 7. 
55  WCT, supra note 52, Preamble; WPPT, supra note 53, Preamble. 
56  See e.g. TRIPS, supra note 51, art 13: (“Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder”). 
57  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, revised in Paris on 24 July 1971, 
828 UNTS 221 [Berne Convention]. 
58  Gervais, “Making Copyright Whole”, supra note 40 at 4. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Dinwoodie, supra note 20 at 756. 
 
16 Vol. 35   Securing the Future of Copyright Users’ Rights in Canada 
 
limitations.61 TRIPS did not depart from the Berne Convention’s formula of balance—copyright along 
with exceptions—62 although referring to balance in its objectives gives the impression that TRIPS has a 
new formula of balance that gives users stronger claims over copyrighted works.63 Also, the traditional 
formula of balance is the same in the WCT. Professor Pamela Samuelson argues that the WCT’s 
recognition of balance in the preamble and the copyright exceptions and limitations in article 10 of the 
WCT are an “endorsement of balancing principles in copyright law.”64 
 The excessive use of the notion of balance in copyright law discourse by different groups defending 
conflicting interests undermines its utility.65 For instance, officials of the World Trade Organization 
[WTO] described TRIPS as a treaty that strikes the right balance between the different interests it 
regulates.66 However, many scholars criticised it as being author-oriented, or imbalanced.67 Furthermore, 
creator and publisher groups that lobbied for introducing the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
[ACTA]68 had argued that piracy and the weak enforcement of copyright weakened copyright balance. On 
the other hand, many viewed ACTA as an anti-balance treaty.69 Here in Canada, creator and publisher 
groups tried to convince the SCC to reverse its approach to users’ rights in CCH, arguing that it tilted the 
copyright balance towards users at the expense of the copyright holders.70 This is consistent with the view 
that the concept of balance has recently taken the form of “cutting back on exclusive rights.”71 
                                                             
61  Ibid. See also Berne Convention, supra note 57, art 9(2) (authorizing national law to permit the reproduction of works 
“provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”) 
62  See e.g. TRIPS, supra note 51, art 13. 
63  Ibid, art 7. See also Peter K Yu, “The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement” 46(4) Hous L Rev 979 
(discussing the role of the objectives of TRIPS in creating balance in international copyright law). 
64  Pamela Samuelson, “The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO” (1997) 37 Va J Int’l L 369 at 436.  
65  See Robert Burrell & Allison Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 191. 
66  See e.g. Pascal Lamy, former WTO Director-General, “The TRIPs Agreement 10 Years on” (Conclusions delivered at 
the International Conference on the 10th Anniversary of the WTO TRIPs, 24 June 2004), online: European Commission 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/june/tradoc_117787.pdf>.  
67  See e.g. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back? (2004) 71 U Chicago L Rev 21 at 
21; Peter M Gerhart, “Why Lawmaking for Global Intellectual Property is Unbalanced” (2000) 22:7 Eur IP Rev 309 at 
309; James Boyle, “A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property” (2004) 9 Duke L & Tech Rev at 3-4. 
68  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 3 December 2010, 50 ILM 243 (opened for signature 1 May 1 2011) [ACTA]. 
69  See e.g. Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting (Held on 8-9 June 2010) IP/C/M/63, online: WTO 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/.../87682/.../IP/C/M63.pdf> at para 256 (China’s representative 
statement). 
70  See “Factum Submitted by Access Copyright to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2012), online: Supreme Court of 
Canada<http://www.scc-csc.ca/factums-memoires/33888/FM020_Respondent_Canadian-Copyright-Licensing-Agency-
Operating-as-Access-Copyright.pdf>. 
In CCH this Court raised expectations when it held that fair dealing is a “user's right”. Those raised 
expectations have led users like the appellants to ask that the right be clarified and made more 
predictable. However, this should not come at the expense of upsetting the balance between users' and 
creators' rights under the Act. 
 See also Scassa, “Interests in the Balance”, supra note 5 at 45-46 (arguing that frequent referencing of the principle of 
balance “reveals a lack of certainty as to both the precise interests in the balance and the rationale for balancing them”). 
71  Jane C Ginsburg, “‘European Copyright Code’ - Back to First Principles (with Some Additional Detail)” (2011) 58 J 
Copyright Soc’y USA 265 at 267. 
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 Courts usually apply balance as a judicial methodology when adjudicating tensions between different 
rights, especially human rights.72 In doing so, courts merely interpret the scope of the litigants’ rights in a 
way consistent with the original weight attributed to them in the relevant statute(s).73 Proponents of 
balance as a judicial methodology argue that it is consistent with this rule and other “notions of rational 
decision making.”74 On the other hand, one critique of this methodology is that “it fails to provide 
principled explanations for results and, therefore, is open to the charge that it usurps the functions of the 
political institutions of government.”75  
 Changing the scope of the entitlements of authors or users to establish copyright balance anew should 
be the task of the Parliament, not courts, in order to achieve certainty and predictability in copyright law. 
The Supreme Court of the United States explained in its discussion of the task of determining the 
appropriate scope of copyright and patent that: 
 
[b]ecause this task involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and 
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, 
and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on 
the other hand, our patent and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.76  
 
In the same vein, the SCC was clear that balancing the interests of the authors and users of works “cannot 
change the express terms of the Copyright Act.”77 Indeed, a court that moves from adjusting the balance 
struck in a statute to establish balance anew, by assigning new values to the interests regulated by the 
statute, assumes a legislative role.78 Arguably, this is acceptable when done for the sake of fulfilling 
fundamental principles connected to the rule of law.79 Madame McLachlin CJ agrees with Lord Cooke on 
urging courts “to assume their role in protecting certain fundamental principles as essential to the rule of 
law and the expression of democratic will, even if these ‘deep rights’ were not in written form.”80 For the 
Chief Justice, fundamental principles that “can prevail over laws and executive action” originate from, at 
                                                             
72  See T Alexander Aleinkoff, “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing” (1987) 96 Yale LJ 943 at 944; Jacco Bomhoff, 
“Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional) Law” 
(2008) 31 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 555 at 555. 
73  The Honourable Justice Frank Iacobucci, “‘Reconciling Rights’ The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to Competing 
Charter Rights” (2003) 20 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 137 at 140. 
74  Aleinkoff, supra note 72 at 944. 
75  Paul W Kahn, “The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell” (1987) 97 
Yale LJ 1 at 1. 
76  Sony Corp. of Am. v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 429 (1984). 
77  CBC v SODRAC, supra note 17 at para 51. 
78  See R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 SCR 606 at 641, 1992 CanLII 72 (SCC) (writing for the court, 
Gonthier J stated: “I fail to see a difference in kind between general provisions where the judiciary would assume part of 
the legislative role and ‘mechanical’ provisions where the judiciary would simply apply the law. The judiciary always 
has a mediating role in the actualization of law, although the extent of this role may vary”). 
79  The rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including 
the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights and standards.” United Nations (UN) Security Council, The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
S/2004/616, (23 August 2004) at para 6. 
80  The Rt Hon Beverley McLachlin, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What Is Going On?” (2006) 4 NZJPIL at 148 
[McLachlin CJ, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles”]. See also Robert Justin Lipkin, “We Are All Judicial Activists 
Now” (2008) 77 U Cin L Rev 181 at 197 (arguing that “when the legislature fails, it is the Court's role to save the day - 
the Court must remedy legislative constitutional failure”). 
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least, three sources: “customary usage; inferences from written constitutional principles; and the norms 
set out or implied in international legal instruments to which the state has adhered.”81 The protection of 
human rights is a fundamental principle because it is a component of the rule of law and requirement of 
both treaty and customary international law.82  
 The next section argues that international human rights law can lend the necessary support to the SCC’s 
characterisation of copyright exceptions as users’ rights. 
 
III. USERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 Canada is a State Party to the ICESCR and ICCPR. It has a duty to respect, protect, and implement the 
rights and freedoms they articulate.83 International human rights law does not have effect in Canada unless 
it is implemented by a legislative act.84 Yet, the Government of Canada cited the Act as one of the vehicles 
by which it endeavours to “strike a fair balance between the rights of creators to receive remuneration for 
use of their works and the needs of users to have reasonable access to these works” under international 
human rights law.85 In addition, the SCC emphasized “[t]he important role of international human rights 
law as an aid in interpreting domestic law.”86 This means the protection of the rights of authors and users 
of works in international human rights law can influence the interpretation of the provisions of the Act. In 
fact, the SCC’s formulation of copyright exceptions as users’ rights, and its liberal interpretations of fair 
dealing, echoes their role in implementing the international human right to participate in culture, which is 




                                                             
81  McLachlin CJ, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles” supra note 80 at 156. 
82  See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Rule of Law- Adopted by 
the Venice Commission at the 86th Plenary Session, (Venice, 25-26 March 2011) at para 41 (listing the respect for 
human rights as one of the rule of law elements). According to the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, (1993) at para 5: (“All human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair 
and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis”). This negates the false hierarchy between civil and 
political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other.  
83  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 [VCLT], art 26: (“Every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”),; Charter of the United 
Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, art 56 (establishing a duty to respect and observe human rights). As a 
declaration from the General Assembly of the UN, the UDHR itself is not legally binding. However, most of its rights 
and freedoms have attained the status of international customary law and therefore are binding upon States. See 
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special 
Representative of the Commission, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Appointed Pursuant to Resolution 1986/41, UNESCOR, 
43rd Sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/23, (1987) 1 at para 22; John P Humphrey, “The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character” in Bertrand G Ramcharan, ed, Human Rights: Thirty Years after the 
Universal Declaration (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979) 21 at 37. 
84  Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 69, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) 
[Baker]. For a discussion of this issue, see also Amissi M Manirabona & François Crépeau, “Enhancing the 
Implementation of Human Rights Treaties in Canadian Law: The Need for a National Monitoring Body” (2012) 1:1 Can 
J Hum Rts 25. 
85  Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Third periodic reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: (Canada), UN Doc 
E/1994/104/Add, (17-20 January 1998) at para 431. 
86  Baker, supra note 84 at para 70. 
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A. The Human Right to Participate in Culture 
 Article 27(1) the UDHR proclaims that “[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life 
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”87 Similarly, 
article 15(1) of the ICESCR recognizes everyone’s right: “a. [t]o take part in cultural life; b. [t]o enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its applications.”88 The human right to participate in culture gives 
everyone the right to access, use, and share culture including works, the subject matter of copyright. 
 
1. Works as a Component of Culture 
 Culture does not have a unified meaning,89 but works explicitly or impliedly fall within one of its 
definitions.90 In 1871, Sir Edward Burnett Tylor defined culture as a “complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society.”91 Knowledge, belief and art aptly comprise works and the latter are clear 
embodiments and expressions of humans’ capabilities. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] includes works in its definition of culture as “the set of distinctive 
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of a society or a social group, and that it 
encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions 
and beliefs.”92 Moreover, in General Comment No. 21,93 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights [CESCR] explained that “culture” within the meaning of article 15(1)(a) encompasses:  
 
[W]ays of life, language, oral and written literature, music and song, non-verbal 
communication, religion or belief systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods 
of production or technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and 
shelter and the arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of 
individuals and communities express their humanity and the meaning they give to their 
existence, and build their world view representing their encounter with the external forces 
affecting their lives... .94 
 
This definition of culture is both source-neutral and format-neutral. A work is part of culture whether it is 
oral, written or visual; whether it is digital or in print; and whether it is produced by a natural or legal 
person, individual or group of individuals, community, or machine.95  
                                                             
87  UDHR, supra note 21. 
88  ICESCR, supra note 21. 
89  See Tzen Wong, Molly Torsen & Claudia Fernandini, “Cultural Diversity and the Arts: Contemporary Challenges for 
Copyright Law” in Tzen Wong & Graham Dutfield, eds, Intellectual Property and Human Development: Current Trends 
and Future Scenarios (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 279 at 280. 
90  For a comprehensive review of the definitions of culture see Alfred Kroeber & Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical 
Review of Concepts and Definitions (Milwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1978). 
91  Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture: Research into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, 
and Custom (London: John Murray, 1871) vol 1 at 1. 
92  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Res 25, UNESCOOR, 31st Sess, UN Doc 31 C/25, 
2001) 1, pmbl. 
93  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 21: Right of Everyone to Take Part in 
Cultural Life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UNESCOR, 
43rd Sess, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/21, (2009) [General Comment No 21].  
94  Ibid at para 13.  
95  Works also come within the definition of “cultural content” and “cultural expressions” under the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 20 October 2005, 2440 UNTS 311. Article 4(2) 
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 In addition to being part of culture referred to in paragraph (a) of article 15(1) of the ICESCR, some 
works could qualify as an object of protection under paragraph (b) of article 15(1). Although paragraph 
(b) seems to speak about inventions rather than literary or artistic expressions,96 the steps to achieve a 
given application of scientific progress or advancement, the process of its operation, and its useful 
functional uses are usually described in literary works. Therefore, enjoying the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications inevitably requires a set of entitlements over accompanying documentation, 
such as manuals and industrial drawings.97 
 
2. Entitlements 
 Together, article 27(1) of the UDHR and article 15(1)(a)-(b) of the ICESCR grant everyone the right to 
participate in cultural life, enjoy arts, and share in the benefits of scientific advancement. The exact content 
and scope of this right has remained until recently underdeveloped, especially in the context of the 
protection and enjoyment of works.98 Nonetheless, in General Comment No. 21, the CESCR identified 
three components of it: “(a) participation in, (b) access to, and (c) contribution to cultural life.”99 
Collectively, these components grant users the right to access works, the right to use works to produce 
new works, and the right to share works with others. 
 First, the right to access works exists in both the participation and access components of the right to 
participate in culture. The participation component covers, inter alia, everyone’s right to “seek and 
develop cultural knowledge and expressions and to share them with others, as well as to act creatively and 
take part in creative activity.”100 The Oxford Dictionary defines “seek” as the “attempt or desire to obtain 
or achieve,”101 defines knowledge as “the sum of what is known,”102 and defines “expression” as “the 
action of making known one’s thoughts or feelings.”103 Since works are primary mediums in which 
cultural knowledge and expressions are stored or reflected, obtaining or achieving cultural knowledge and 
expressions is inseparable from access—defined as “the right or opportunity to use or benefit from 
something”104—to these works, whether literary, scientific, or artistic. As explained by the General 
                                                             
defines cultural content as: (“the symbolic meaning, artistic dimension and cultural values that originate from or express 
cultural identities,” and article 4(3) defines cultural expressions as “those expressions that result from the creativity of 
individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content”). 
96  See UNESCO, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications: Outcome of the Experts’ 
Meeting held on 16-17 July 2009 in Venice, Italy (Paris: UNESCO, 2009) at para 12(a) [Venice Statement] (noting that 
the right in article 15(1)(b) “is applicable to all fields of science and its applications”). 
97  Most corporations assert their copyright over pamphlets and brochures accompanying their innovation even when it is 
patent-protected. See Elizabeth F Judge & Daniel J Gervais, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada, 2d ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2011) at 1125-1185 (discussing overlap of intellectual property protection). 
98  William A Schabas, “Study of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific and Technological Progress and its 
Applications” in Yvonne Donders & Vladimir Volodin, eds, Human Rights in Education, Science, and Culture: Legal 
Developments and Challenges (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007) 273 at 274. 
99  General Comment No. 21, supra note 93 at para 15. 
100  Ibid at para 15(a). See also Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their 
Contribution to It, UNESCOOR, 19th Sess, Res 4.126, (1976) Annex I 29 at para I.2(b) [“UNESCO Recommendation”] 
(defining the right to participate in culture as “the concrete opportunities guaranteed for all-groups or individuals-to 
express themselves freely, to communicate, act, and engage in creative activities with a view to the full development of 
their personalities, a harmonious life and the cultural progress of society”). 
101  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3d, sub verbo “seek”. According to the VCLT, supra note 83, art 31.1: (“[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose”).  
102  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3d, sub verbo “knowledge”. 
103  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3d, sub verbo “expression”. 
104  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3d, sub verbo “access”. 
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Conference of UNESCO, access to culture refers to “the concrete opportunities available to everyone, in 
particular through the creation of the appropriate socio-economic conditions, for freely obtaining 
information, training, knowledge and understanding, and for enjoying cultural values and cultural 
property.”105 All the more so, the “access to” component of the right to participate in cultural life gives 
users the rights, amongst other things: first, “to know and understand [their] own culture and that of others 
through education and information;”106 second, “to follow a way of life associated with the use of cultural 
goods and resources;”107 and third, “to benefit from the cultural heritage and the creation of other 
individuals and communities.”108  
 Human beings naturally seek knowledge in order to achieve “the capacity for self-improvement.”109 
For this quest, Jean Jacques Rousseau argues, people gave up the state of equality that had characterized 
the state of nature and took a path toward slavery, as seeking knowledge is one of the occasions in which 
humans are interdependent and not self-sufficient.110 Humans’ need for knowledge in modern societies is 
self-evident and their interdependence with regard to its creation and use is inevitable—a pair of 
circumstances that will generate inequality according to Rousseau. Thus, providing for users’ rights to 
access, use, and share works, along with authors’ human rights over their intellectual creations, which are 
articulated in Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR, is an attempt by international 
human rights law to restore (or guarantee) the just order in the ecosystem of knowledge creation, use, and 
distribution. 
 Second, the right of users to use and build upon existing works to create new works rests under the 
participation component of the right to participate in cultural life. Users’ right to “develop cultural 
knowledge and expressions”111 entails the right to use them for the purpose of producing further works or 
improving the existing ones. To develop is to “grow or cause to grow and become more mature, advanced, 
or elaborate.”112 Thus, developing cultural knowledge and expressions intrinsically implies a process 
whereby users make changes to existing works to improve them or transform them into new works. As 
culture becomes more infused with digital content, the reciprocal relationship between creation and use 
of intellectual works becomes more conspicuous and marks a remarkable shift of the emphasis from the 
“read-only culture”113 to the “read and write culture.”114 In the “read-only culture”, the use of works takes 
the traditional forms of reading and quoting, whereas in the “read and write culture” it extends to take 
                                                             
105  UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 100 at para I.2(a). 
106  General Comment No. 21, supra note 93 at para 15(b). 
107  Ibid. 
108  Ibid. 
109  Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, translated by GDH Cole (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger, 2004) at 29-30. 
See also Alfred L. Brophy, “The Law Book in Colonial America”, Book Review of A History of the Book in America: 
The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World by David Hall & Hugh Amory, eds, (2003) 51 Buff L Rev 1119 at 1119, n 3 
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111  General Comment No. 21, supra note 93 at para 15(b). 
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Creativity (New York: Penguin Press, 2004) at 37 [Lessig, Free Culture]. 
114  Ibid. 
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another interface in which people, in addition; mix words, images, videos or sounds to produce new works 
and share them using digital networks. 115 
 Third, users have the right to “share” with others whatever works they have accessed or further 
developed by virtue of their rights to access and use works. Users receive this right first from the 
participation component of the right to participate in culture, which provides for the right to “share” 
cultural knowledge and expressions with others.116 Further, they receive it from the “contribution to 
cultural life” component, which gives everyone the right “to be involved in creating the spiritual, material, 
intellectual and emotional expressions of the community”117 and “to take part in the development of the 
community to which a person belongs.”118 The right to share works complements and facilitates the rights 
to access and use them. It corresponds to people’s tendency to share knowledge given its non-rival 
nature.119 It is essential for enabling innovation in the information economy.120 It also normatively 
promotes new socio-economic models for knowledge production, such as “common-based peer 
production,”121 and knowledge sharing, such as in free software,122 and Creative Commons [CC] 
licensing.123 These models are a reaction to the dissatisfaction with the exclusive-rights approach toward 
works, which emphasizes rights holders’ control and discourages knowledge sharing.124 They facilitate 
                                                             
115  Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (New York: Penguin Press, 2008) at 
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116  See General Comment No. 21, supra note 93 at para 15(a). 
117  Ibid at para 15(c). 
118  Ibid. 
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(2002) 112 Yale LJ 369. 
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online: Creative Commons <http://creativecommons.org/about>. See also Lawrence Lessig, “The Creative Commons” 
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zone” of knowledge that everyone can use and enrich).  
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the sharing and distribution of works,125 thus giving effect to new paradigms viewing knowledge as a 
“commons—a resource shared by a group of people that is subject to social dilemmas.”126 
 Users’ rights to access, use, and share works are important pillars in the architecture of “free culture”, 
in which culture and its development are free from the strict control of the cultural industry,127 free from 
the requirement of permissions before accessing, using, and sharing its elements,128 and free in that 
individuals can “add or mix as they see fit”129 in building upon works.130 Free culture uses the tools of 
copyright and contract law to implement the said freedoms. At the same time, users’ human right to 
participate in culture can provide these freedoms with an important normative ground. This ground is 
necessary, given some scholars’ concern that open content models may negatively impact the economic 
interests of copyright collective societies to an extent that causes a tension between those societies and 
authors to the detriment of the human rights of both authors and users.131  
 In article 27(1) of the UDHR and article 15(1)(a)-(b) of the ICESCR, the rights belong to “everyone”: 
a natural person, group of individuals, or community.132 Consequently, legal persons do not benefit from 
these rights. Both articles emerged from the recognition of the importance of the enjoyment of works for 
the dignity and full development of the personality of the human being,133 and legal persons have neither 
dignity nor human personality to be developed by using works. Admittedly, this adversely impacts the 
role of the cultural industry in enriching culture. 
 The human right to participate in culture is interdependent with the right to education and freedom of 
expression. 
 
B. The Human Right to Education 
 The UDHR gives everyone the right to education in article 26.134 It makes education in elementary 
(primary) stages both free of charge and compulsory, and it requires the availability of technical and 
professional education as well as equal accessibility to higher education.135 Article 26 states the purpose 
of the human right to education as the achievement of the full development of the human personality and 
the promotion, understanding, and respect of human rights.136 In addition, it gives parents a “prior right”137 
to make a choice with respect to their children’s education. The human right to education is also enshrined 
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and elaborated in articles 13 and 14 of the ICESCR.138 Notably, article 13 of the ICESCR adds three 
objectives to the human right to education: developing the “sense of dignity”139 of the human personality, 
enabling participation in a free society, and promoting tolerance and understanding amongst nations and 
all different groups.140 
 Education is in itself a human right and an essential tool for the realization of other human rights, such 
as the human right to an adequate standard of living and a wide range of democratic rights.141 The CESCR 
describes it as “one of the joys and rewards of human existence.”142 Due to a historical bias against 
economic, social and cultural rights — and accompanying arguments relating to their justiciability and 
positive nature — not all States have treated the human right to education equally. For instance, the US 
Constitution does not protect the right to education.143 Likewise, the Charter does not have an express 
provision on education, except with respect to minority language education,144 although the SCC 
emphasized the importance of education for society.145 On the other hand, many national Constitutions 
protect the human right to, at least, primary education.146 
 The human right to education has “interrelated and essential features”147 summarized in the so-called 
“4-A scheme”148; namely availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability.149 Availability refers 
to the existence of an adequate and quality educational system that provides appropriate material 
infrastructure and human resources for the educational operation.150 Accessibility means that educational 
institutions and programs are available to everyone without discrimination on any ground (non-
discrimination), they are physically within reach to everyone, and they are free for primary education and 
shall be “progressively free”151 for secondary and higher education.152 Acceptability means that education 
is of good quality and is relevant and appropriate to a student’s culture.153 Finally, adaptability means that 
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education is responsive to students’ needs in light of continuous social and cultural changes.154 The 4A 
elements are relevant to education in all its levels: primary, secondary, higher, and fundamental.155 
 The human right to participate in culture—comprising the rights to access, use, and share works—is 
inherently connected with the human right to education. Education will not be available when students 
lack access to works, such as books, journals, or computer programs, nor will it be accessible when these 
educational materials are unaffordable or their communication electronically in the course of distance 
learning is prohibited. The human right to education will not achieve acceptability or adaptability when 
works are not available in the relevant language of the students or in a format accessible by students with 
special needs. The Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC]156 explicitly requires that educational and 
vocational information, material, and guidance be available and accessible by children.157 Books, journals, 
computer programs, art, and other teaching materials, along with the means of their communication, such 
as the internet, radio, or television, form the main channels of information and knowledge necessary for a 
good quality learning environment.158 Therefore, “[c]lose contact with contemporary technological and 
scientific knowledge should be possible at every level of education.”159 
 The relation between the human right to education and the human right to participate in culture stems 
from the function of education as a channel “through which individuals and communities pass on their 
values, religion, customs, language and other cultural references.”160 In Europe, while the European 
Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]161 does not include a general provision on the right to participate 
in culture, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) touched upon the role of education in streaming 
culture through its interpretation of the concept as referred to in article 2 of the Protocol No.1 of the 
ECHR,162 noting that education is “the whole process whereby, in any society, adults endeavour to transmit 
their beliefs, culture and other values to the young.”163 Similarly, earlier in 1954, the Supreme Court of 
the United States unanimously stated in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,164 a case that banned 
school segregation, that education is “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.”165 
 Fulfilling the human right to education is costly and the State bears an important share of its cost; 
however, the cost for affording works is magnified by the effect of copyright. Arguably, the Act respects 
and protects the human right to education by articulating both fair dealing and other education-specific 
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exceptions that allow access, use, and sharing of works for educational purposes without the permission 
of rights holders.166 Thus, treating these exceptions as users’ rights by the SCC serves the human right to 
participate in culture and the human right to education, both of which are interrelated and interdependent 
with freedom of expression. 
 
C. Freedom of Expression 
 Freedom of expression is a cornerstone in the legal and political structure of all free and democratic 
societies.167 It is a gate for “seeking and attaining the truth”168 and a guarantee for “the diversity in forms 
of individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing.”169 The UDHR and ICCPR secure this freedom to 
everyone and define it to include the right to “hold opinions without interference” and to “seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas.”170 
 The right to seek, receive, and impart ideas is an integral part of the right to participate in culture, which 
supports users’ rights to access, use, and share works.171 The participation component of the right to 
participate in culture, like freedom of expression, grants users the right to “seek” cultural knowledge and 
expression.172 More explicitly, the access component of the right to participate in culture provides 
everyone with the right “to learn about forms of expression and dissemination through any technical 
medium of information or communication.”173 At the same time, this is also a component of freedom of 
expression, which includes “the expression and receipt of communications of every form of idea and 
opinion capable of transmission to others.”174 The interdependence between the right to participate in 
culture and freedom of expression also appears in the CESCR’s interpretation of States’ obligations 
toward the human right to participate in culture in article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR to include, inter alia, 
“the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds and forms including art forms, 
regardless of frontiers of any kind.”175 The CESCR explained that this right “implies the right of all 
persons to have access to, and to participate in, varied information exchanges, and to have access to 
cultural goods and services, understood as vectors of identity, values and meaning.”176 In short, the human 
right to participate in culture and freedom of expression share, among other things, the objective of 
entitling humans to access and share works in any form. Nonetheless, according to article 19(3)(a) of the 
ICCPR, the human right to “seek, receive, and impart information and ideas” may be subject to “certain 
restrictions,”177 provided that they are prescribed by law and “necessary”178 for, inter alia, the “respect of 
the rights or reputations of others.”179 The protection of authors’ moral and material interests by means of 
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exclusive rights may fit under this category of exceptions; however, this does not negate the human rights 
nature of users’ rights over works.  
 For example, under article 10(1) of the ECHR, freedom of expression includes the right to “receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”180 
However, article 10(2) allows the possibility of restricting freedom of expression if the restrictions “are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society... for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.”181 The interaction between users’ freedom of expression as a justification for reproducing 
others’ works and the limits imposed by copyright upon this freedom came under the scrutiny of the 
ECtHR. In Ashby Donald and others v France,182 the ECtHR held that the applicants’ copyright-infringing 
dissemination of photographs for free or in exchange for remuneration fell within the ambit of article 10 
of ECHR.183 Thus, the convictions against them by the French courts constituted interference with their 
rights under article 10.184 However, this did not amount to a violation of these rights since the interference 
was both prescribed by law and necessary in a free and democratic society for the protection of others’ 
rights.185 The Court affirmed that copyright was property protected under article 1 of Protocol No. 1186 
and that national courts had a wide margin of appreciation when they balanced it with freedom of 
expression.187 The ECtHR also considered the commercial nature of the use of  the photographs by the 
applicants as another factor to allow the national courts a wide margin of appreciation.188 Similarly, in 
Neij v Sweden,189 the ECtHR held that running a website facilitating sharing of works, including those 
protected by copyright, benefited from the protection of article 10 of the ECHR and therefore the 
applicants’ copyright infringement convictions interfered with their freedom of expression.”190 However, 
the ECtHR held that such interference was justified. Amongst the factors it considered to reach this 
conclusion was that the distributed materials did not amount to “political expression and debate.”191 
 In Canada, freedom of expression under the Charter192 failed to justify users’ unauthorized use of 
copyrighted works beyond the boundaries delineated in the Act. For example, in R v James Lorimer & 
Co.,193 involving an infringement claim against a publisher that had abridged a seven-volume 
governmental report into one volume, the Federal Court of Appeal rejected the defendants’ freedom of 
expression defense, as the abridged work included “[s]o little of [their] own thought, belief, opinion and 
expression.”194 In another case,195 involving the unauthorized distribution of materials carrying a business 
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logo—Michelin Man—in a union drive, the Federal Court held that “[t]he Charter does not confer the 
right to use private property—the plaintiff's copyright—in the service of freedom of expression,”196 and 
that copyright “minimally impairs the defendants’ right of free expression by the very well-tailored 
structure of the Copyright Act with its list of exceptions.”197  
 This approach presumed that the idea/expression dichotomy and infringement exceptions automatically 
balanced authors’ exclusive rights under the Act against users’ freedom of expression under the Charter.198 
It meant that courts would disregard, at the outset, freedom of expression defenses in copyright 
infringement cases.199 The substantial misappropriation of others’ expressions is an important standard to 
determine copyright infringement, but it should not automatically abrogate the freedom of expression 
analysis under constitutional law in copyright infringement cases.200 The assumption that parliaments have 
already weighed in users’ freedom of expression in the bundle of rights and exceptions embodied in 
copyright statutes in advance excuses courts from identifying instances, not envisaged by statutory 
copyright exceptions, where copyright may encroach upon freedom of expression.201 
 
IV. COPYRIGHT USERS’ RIGHTS: THE ECHO OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 The list of copyright exceptions in the Act serves, among other interests and values, the human right to 
participate in culture, the human right to education, and freedom of expression.202 For instance, the linkage 
between the purposes of fair dealing and human rights is intuitive. By engaging in news reporting, 
criticism, review, satire or parody, one is both practicing his or her freedom of expression and serving 
others’ freedom of expression.203 Similarly, as explained earlier, research, private study, and education 
fall under the big umbrella of the human right to education and are necessary vehicles for the fulfilment 
of other human rights, including freedom of expression and the right to participate in culture.  
 In addition to fair dealing, the Act includes exceptions necessary for implementing a wide set of users’ 
human rights. These include, for instance, the exception allowing the reproduction of works in non-
commercial user-generated content [UGC],204 exceptions permitting reproduction for the purpose of 
facilitating archives’ and museums’ tasks in preserving culture,205 exceptions permitting the use of works 
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by educational institutions,206 and exceptions for the reproduction of works in alternate format for persons 
with perceptual disabilities.207 
 The SCC’s liberal interpretation of fair dealing, and generally its treatment of copyright exceptions as 
users’ rights, is infused with the content of the human right to participate in culture, freedom of expression, 
and the human right to education.208 In CCH, the SCC gave research “a large and liberal interpretation in 
order to ensure that users’ rights are not unduly constrained”209 and, as a result, did not limit it to non-
commercial or private uses.210 Accordingly, the SCC found the research done by lawyers for commercial 
purposes to fall within the meaning of research for the purpose of section 29.211 In the same way, the SCC 
liberally defined research in SOCAN v Bell to include not only research for “creative purposes”212 but also 
research for the purposes of the “dissemination of works”213  and “private study.”214 This liberal 
interpretation captured “many activities that do not demand the establishment of new facts or 
conclusions.”215 The SCC rejected restricting the meaning of research to “creating something new,”216 
which could have imported the transformation factor of the United States fair use analysis into the analysis 
of fair dealing and thus could have limited the benefits of fair dealing to authors only.217 The SCC’s 
approach resonates with the focus of Article 27(1) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(a)-(b) of the ICESCR 
on the use, enjoyment, and consumption of works, rather than on their role in enabling the production of 
new works.218 Consequently, it held that allowing users to listen to thirty to ninety second previews of 
musical works available on the websites of online music providers before making a purchase was for the 
purpose of “research” within the meaning of section 29.219  
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 Interpreted liberally by the SCC in SOCAN v Bell, research covers a great deal of the content of the 
human right to participate in culture as interpreted by the CESCR, including its freedom of expression 
component. Holding that the dissemination of works per se falls within the meaning of research is 
consistent with the substance of freedom of expression, which incorporates “the right to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers.”220 The SCC’s decision in CCH also 
emphasized the importance of the dissemination of works, unless confidential: “if a work has not been 
published, the dealing may be more fair in that its reproduction with acknowledgement could lead to a 
wider public dissemination of the work — one of the goals of copyright law.”221 
 In Alberta (Education), the SCC impliedly supported the human right to education, freedom of 
expression, and the right to participate in culture when it held that “photocopies made by a teacher and 
provided to primary and secondary school students are an essential element in the research and private 
study undertaken by those students.”222 It rejected the characterization of students’ usage in the classroom 
of photocopies made for them by teachers as “non-private study”223 and held that “the word ‘private’ in 
‘private study’ should not be understood as requiring users to view copyrighted works in splendid 
isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal endeavours, whether they are engaged in with 
others or in solitude.”224  
 In short, the SCC’s treatment of copyright exceptions as users’ rights and liberal interpretation of fair 
dealing in CCH, SOCAN v Bell, and Alberta (Education) echo the title and nature of users’ rights over 
works in international human rights law. As Professor David Vaver explains: 
 
It may not just be the Charter that is affecting how the Supreme Court views copyright 
today. International human rights law may be playing its part, too. When Abella J. spoke 
in SOCAN v. Bell--the music preview (or more accurately music pre-hearing) case--of the 
role of user rights as being “to achieve the proper balance between protection and access” 
in the Copyright Act, … she was partly reflecting how international human rights law treats 
intellectual property rights. To reflect human rights fully, however, she would have 
reversed the order of her statement, to say that user rights reflect the proper balance 
between, first, access and, second, protection. That is how both the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights of 1966 prioritize access and intellectual property.225 
 
The SCC jurisprudence on users’ rights did not refer to international human rights law explicitly, but this 
is not surprising.226 First of all, in general, the Charter does not explicitly protect economic, social and 
cultural rights, although the SCC left the possibility open for interpreting some of these rights to fall under 
section 7, which grants everyone “the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”227 Second, the SCC 
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emphasized that “to the extent this Court has recognized a “Charter values” interpretive principle, such 
principle can only receive application in circumstances of genuine ambiguity, i.e., where a statutory 
provision is subject to differing, but equally plausible, interpretations.”228 Third, despite the early 
codification of the rights of authors and users in article 27 of the UDHR and article 15 of ICESCR, these 
two sets of rights were amongst the least developed human rights,229 and, for a long time, international 
intellectual property law, a main source of Canada’s intellectual property law, and international human 
rights law were “strangers.”230 
 Today, however, there are compelling reasons to look at the different interests regulated by copyright 
law, and intellectual property law in general, through an international human rights law lens. The impact 
of intellectual property law on human rights and freedoms is well known,231 and international human rights 
law plays a role in shaping intellectual property law.232 Moreover, the historical bias against economic, 
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social and cultural rights is no longer sustainable.233 Here in Canada, the SCC’s formulation of copyright 
exceptions as users’ rights has made Canadian copyright law more than ever closer to international human 
rights law. Therefore, an amendment to the Act that explicitly refers to copyright exceptions as users’ 
rights and embodies their content under human rights law would be timely to end the uncertainty regarding 
their nature, label, and scope.234 Until then, Canadian courts have a new incentive to continue embracing 
users’ rights, become explicit about their human rights nature, and interpret them accordingly.235 In 
interpreting the provisions of the Act, Canadian courts need to consider “[t]he important role of 
international human rights law as an aid in interpreting domestic law”236 and “presume that legislation is 
intended to comply with Canada’s obligations under international instruments.”237 
 
V. THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN USERS’ HUMAN RIGHTS AND AUTHORS’ MORAL 
AND MATERIAL INTERESTS 
 
 The protection of authors’ moral and material interests resulting from their intellectual works stems 
from both article 27(2) of the UDHR, stating that “[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author,”238 and article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR, which recognizes the right of everyone “[t]o benefit from 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.”239 The pillars of this protection are a human author and a scientific, 
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literary or artistic work. Authors’ moral and material interests protect the “personal link”240 between 
authors and their works.241 The author can be an individual or a group of individuals, but cannot be a legal 
person.242  Although the articles use the term “everyone” in referring to authors, which ostensibly includes 
legal persons,243 the drafters “appeared to be thinking almost exclusively of authors as individuals.”244 
The production of works conveys on an individual the necessary quality of being an author. Article 27(2) 
of the UDHR and article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR provide authors with special protection, whereas most 
of the provisions of the UDHR and ICESCR apply to all individuals without distinction of any kind. 
 The two articles entitle authors to the protection of their moral and material interests in works. An 
author has the right to be recognized as the creator of the work and to object to its distortion or derogatory 
modification,245 because works are “expressions of the personality of their creator.”246 In addition, authors 
have the right to generate economic benefits from their works. States may implement this right by various 
means, including one-time payments and exclusive rights (copyright) allowing authors to exploit their 
works for a limited period of time.247 The protection of authors’ material interests must be “effective,”248 
in that it is capable of “enabling authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living.”249 At the same time, 
States must ensure that the protection does not “unjustifiably limit other people’s enjoyment of their rights 
under the [ICESCR].”250 
 Evaluating the true impact of users’ human rights on authors’ moral and material interests requires 
acknowledging that an exclusive right regime is only one model for giving effect to authors’ moral and 
material interests. Where conflicts arise between this model and users’ human rights, it is because existing 
exclusive rights regimes might go beyond the scope of authors’ rights in human rights law.251 Furthermore, 
the effect of authors’ use of existing works in decreasing the costs of producing new works should be 
counted in the impact analysis along with the positive or negative impact that users’ human rights may 
have on the market for works. Users’ human rights—like authors’ human rights—are not absolute. They 
do not privilege anyone “to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
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the rights and freedoms recognized in the [ICESCR],”252 including authors’ human rights.253 Both sets of 
rights are de facto interdependent,254 although the models of their implementation can maintain or disturb 
their interdependence. 
 The success of new knowledge production and dissemination models, such as GPL licenses, Creative 
Commons, and Wikipedia, indicates that a significant number of authors, whether writers, musicians, or 
software programmers, believe that the respect of their moral and material interests, even when in the form 
of exclusive rights, does not necessarily require upsetting users’ human rights.255 By the same token, users’ 
human rights do not necessarily result in depriving authors of their moral and material interests. Authors 
can still benefit from these interests while users fairly enjoy works.256 
 In Canada, users’ rights are subject to limitations designed to safeguard authors’ rights against 
economic prejudice. For instance, some users’ rights apply only when a mechanism for remunerating 
authors is already in place.257 Moreover, the second step in the fair dealing analysis is the determination 
of the “fairness” element.  The SCC identified six factors that aid in the finding of fairness: “(1) the 
purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to 
the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work.”258 The analysis of 
the last factor will consider questions such as whether the reproduction of the work will compete with the 
work in the market,259 which may make the dealing unfair.260 However, the SCC explained that 
“[a]lthough the effect of the dealing on the market of the copyright owner is an important factor, it is 
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neither the only factor nor the most important factor that a court must consider in deciding if the dealing 
is fair.”261 A full human rights-approach to authors’ and users’ rights perhaps requires revisiting, amongst 
other aspects in Canadian copyright law, the weight given to this factor. To reiterate, the ability to achieve 
an adequate standard of living is a requirement of the effective protection of authors’ material interests in 




 The Act does not disclose its purpose. It provides authors with exclusive economic and moral rights. It 
also addresses the public interest in the dissemination and use of works through copyright exceptions and 
limitations. However, in recent years, the SCC has repeatedly interpreted the purpose of the Act as to 
achieve a balance between authors’ rights and the public interest in the dissemination and use of works. 
The SCC has also relied upon this purpose to characterize copyright exceptions as users’ rights and to 
interpret them liberally. 
 Relying on the notion of balance to change the label and weight of copyright exceptions in Canadian 
copyright law is problematic. Establishing copyright law balance in national and international copyright 
law has traditionally revolved around copyright protection, on the one hand, and copyright exceptions and 
limitations, on the other. Equally important, balance can be a route for courts to assume a legislative 
function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine,262 which the SCC described as one of the 
“essential features of our constitution.”263 Balance alone may not justify this violation, despite its long 
history in copyright law. A human rights-based approach might make it easier for Canadian courts to 
continue recognizing copyright exceptions as users’ rights, particularly if interpreted in alignment with 
established Charter jurisprudence. This, in turn, would bring Canadian copyright law closer to the 
international regime of human rights, which currently recognizes users’ rights as logical extensions to the 
rights to participate in culture, freedom of expression, and education. In an increasingly globalized legal 
and business environment, such an alignment might not only be an incontestable necessity, but an essential 
means of protecting users’ rights. 
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